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A SURVEY OF GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFERS -
THE PRESENT RULE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF REFORM
by B. Britt Jarvis
A grantor may avoid federal estate and gift taxes in one or more gen-
erations by disposing of his property in a generation-skipping transfer'
For example, if a father gave property to his son for life with a remainder
to his grandchildren, a taxable transfer would not occur at the death of the
son because present law does not consider the termination of the son's life
estate as a transfer of property Therefore, after the grantor pays the gift
tax on the transfer, the federal estate and gift taxes are avoided until the
grandchild transfers the property. By the use of a trust, special powers of
appointment and limited rights to invade the corpus, the grantor may leave
the intermediate beneficiary, his son, in virtually complete control of the
property and at the same time avoid federal estate and gift taxes upon the
son's death. Since generation-skipping transfers deprive the intermediate
beneficiary of complete control over the property, they can be used only
when the testator decides that the tax advantage to be obtained outweighs
the disadvantage to the intermediate generation.
A Definition of Generation Skipping. A generation-skipping transfer is
the gratuitous transfer of property so that the fee interest may vest only
in individuals two or more generations younger than the grantor. Usually
persons one or more generations younger than the grantor will have an
intervening limited interest which will terminate upon the passage of time
or the occurrence of some other event.' Transfers that receive the tax bene-
fits of generation skipping may be in various forms. An outright gift by a
grandfather to his grandchildren would avoid the estate tax in one genera-
tion, but the intermediate generation would receive no benefit. Other me-
thods may be used to avoid estate taxes in one generation and still allow
the intermediate generation to enjoy some benefits from the property. The
grant of a life estate by a father to his son with the remainder to the grand-
children is one of the more common types. A person also may give or devise
the property for a term of years to the intermediate generation with the
remainder to the testator's grandchildren. Greater flexibility may be ob-
tained by making the transfer in trust. The beneficiary's interest may be a
definite income interest or may be in the discretion of the trustee. Fur-
thermore, the intermediate beneficiaries may be given the power to dispose
of the corpus by the use of special powers of appointment and by the use
of limited powers to invade the corpus for their benefit.
Generation-skipping transfers may also be made to collateral relatives
or persons who are not relatives. Generally in these cases the relative ages
1 G. JANTSCHER, TRUSTS AND ESTATE TAXATION 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as JANTSCHER];
C. SHOUP, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 51 (1966) [hereinafter cited as SHOUP].
22 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 20.10 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as MERTENS].
3 SHOUP 33-36.
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of the grantor and the holder of the limited interest must be examined to
determine if any taxes have been avoided. For example, if a nephew and
uncle were the same age, and the uncle gave the nephew a limited interest,
an examination of the time sequence involved would show that no genera-
tions were actually skipped. In general, when a person gives an individual
who is not a direct descending relative a limited interest, generation skip-
ping occurs if the donee is of such an age that he could be the donor's son
or daughter. Thirty years4 is commonly used as the time span between the
ages of the donor and donee which determines if a generation has been
skipped.
As long as the beneficiaries are direct descendants of the donor, the defi-
nitional problems are greatly reduced. However, when the beneficiaries
are collaterals or non-relatives, the definition of generation skipping be-
comes more difficult, and proper definition becomes extremely important
when legislation is considered to prevent the use of generation-skipping
transfers for tax avoidance. Since this constitutes one of the most obvious
and widely used loopholes in the present federal gift and estate tax sys-
tem,' those concerned with tax policy have searched for a way to prevent
its use. Though several proposals have been made, none has been adopted.
I. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW
The heart of generation-skipping tax law involves the basic rule that
estate taxes are due only upon property owned by the decedent and sub-
ject to transfer at his death. Since life estates or other limited interests ter-
minate upon death, there is nothing to transfer after the holder's death
and no portion of the interest is taxable to the decedent's gross estate.!
The entire subject is governed by section 2033 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which provides that "[t]he value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent
at the time of his death." 7 In applying this to life estates, the courts have
held that a life estate is not an interest which passes at death. For example,
in May v. Heiner' the Supreme Court said, "At the death of Mrs. May, no
interest in the property held under the trust deed passed from her to the
living; title thereto had been definitely fixed by the trust deed. The inter-
est therein which she possessed immediately prior to her death was obliter-
ated by that event."'
4 ALI, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROJECT 184 (Study Draft No. 1, 1965) [herein-
after cited as ALI Study Draft No. 1].
' Alexander, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation: The Major Issues Presented in the American
Law Institute Project, 22 TAX L. REv. 635, 641 (1967).
62 MERTENS §§ 14.40, 20.10.
7 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2033.
8281 U.S. 238 (1929).
9 1d. at 243. The Tax Court has incidentally passed upon the question of the inclusion of a
life estate within the gross estate. In Estate of Susie C. Haggett, 14 T.C. 325 (1950), the court
was passing upon the effect of an annuity contract. In analogizing the annuity to other life inter-
ests, the court said, "The present decedent's interest in the annuity contract was that of a life
beneficiary. . . . We, therefore, hold that the respondent erred in including in the decedent's gross
estate any part of the principal of the annuity contract." Id. at 330. The effect of a life estate
upon the gross estate was also considered in Estate of Mary Clare Milner, 6 T.C. 874 (1946).
There, the court made the following statement:
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The failure to assess a tax on the termination of a limited interest created
by a third party is the basis for the generation-skipping device. The exclu-
sion results because an interest which terminates at the death of the dece-
dent is not owned at death. This line of reasoning should apply to other
limited interests which terminate prior to or at the death of the holder,
such as the beneficiary's interest in a discretionary trust. Since such a limi-
ted interest created by a third party is not taxed upon the death of the
beneficiary, generation skipping is possible.
State substantive law, however, provides some limits on this type of
transfer. If the Rule Against Perpetuities did not exist, a grantor theoret-
ically could grant infinite successions of life interests." However, the Rule
Against Perpetuities requires that vesting be assured not more than twen-
ty-one years after the termination of the lives in being at the time of
transfer."' This Rule reduces the time that generation-skipping grants may
exempt the property from federal estate and gift taxation. However, the
property may still escape taxation for about a century in many instances."
If the generation-skipping transfer is made in the traditional life tenant-
remainderman transaction, the grantor is unable to exercise much control
over the donee's use of the property or provide for changed circumstances
among the heirs, and therefore he may find generation skipping relatively
undesirable. This inflexibility can be reduced somewhat by the use of con-
ditional fees, determinable fees, and fees subject to divestment. However,
these are also limited by state property law. The most common conditions
individuals place on gifts or devises in order to exercise future control
concern the donee's ability to alienate the property, the marital status of
the donee and the ways the donee may use the property. Although a per-
son may generally deed or will his property in any manner which he de-
sires," due to public policy the law has limited the power of the donor to
impose these restrictions in certain instances." A restriction which pre-
vents the free alienation of a common law estate generally is void." How-
ever, two common exceptions exist in Texas. The grantor may place prop-
erty in a trust which includes a "spendthrift clause" without having the
conveyance endangered. Second, the lessee's interest in property may not
be sold without the consent of the lessor.' Therefore, the grantor, if he so
Under the settlement . . . the decedent . . . acquired nothing more than the right
to the net income from an undivided one-half interest in the real estate during her
life, or in other words, a mere life estate, and the remainder after such life estate
was acquired by Gustrine Milner Jackson and Mary Clare Milner Morse and their
lineal descendants. If . . . the latter two acquired such remainder interest from the
estate of Gustrine Kay Milner, we see no reason for holding that . . . such re-
mainder interest constituted 'any interest' in property of the decedent, . . . or any
interest in property with respect to which she did or could make a transfer of the
kind described in Section 811(c).
Id. at 883.
"0JANTSCHER 25.
11 L. SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS 253 (2d ed. 1966).
12 JANTSCHER 26.
'United States Nat'l Bank v. Snodgrass, 202 Ore. 530, 275 P.2d 860 (1954).14 id.
" Pritchett v. Badgett, 257 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), error ref.
"aLindsey v. Rose, 175 S.W. 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915), error ref.
"Dillingham v. Williams, 165 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), error ref.; TEx. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5237 (1962).
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desires, should be able to restrict a grant for a term of years so that the
grantee would be unable to sell it. In fact, absent such a restriction, the
holder of a term interest may not be able to alienate his interest without
the consent of the grantor, or his heirs or assigns, under a liberal reading
of article 5237.18
A condition to discourage the remarriage of wives or the marriage of
sons and daughters occasionally creeps into wills. A devise which conditions
the vesting upon the persons divorcing their present spouse is void in most
jurisdictions." However, Texas allows such a devise if there is "no manifest
intent to incite divorce. ' Texas also allows devise to a wife with a condi-
tion divesting her of the property upon her remarriage." Though some
restrictions in this area are not allowed, in general any reasonable restric-
tions will be allowed," and the courts are rather liberal in their definition
of reasonable."
A condition that property shall be used only for a particular purpose
generally is valid.' A possible exception exists if the restriction as to use
is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or a state constitu-
tion." The courts, however, do not favor these use restrictions and will
hold them to represent covenants or expressions of intent rather than a
limitation on the estate granted whenever possible."
The only really important limitation on generation skipping imposed
by the substantive law of property is the Rule Against Perpetuities. How-
ever, some transfers could cut across the other limitations imposed by the
substantive law, and these must be considered where the grantor wishes to
place conditions upon the grantee's freedom to deal with the property.
II. GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFERS
The Limited Interest. Life estates, term interests, and discretionary inter-
ests are common limited interests which can be given to the intermediate
generation in order to avoid estate taxes. The life estate has been used often
and has few of the problems which plague the other limited interests. It
has the disadvantage of being inflexible and unable to take into account
the changes in the circumstances of the individuals."'
The use of term interests in generation skipping has not been extensive,
and, therefore, its relation to generation skipping is generally of an aca-
"STEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5237 (1962).
"Fineman v. Central Nat'l Bank, 161 N.E.2d 557 (Ohio P. Ct. 1959).
"Hunt v. Carroll, 157 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), error dismissed; Ellis v. Birkhead,
71 S.W. 31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902), error ref.
"Little v. Bridwell, 21 Tex. 597 (1858); Foote v. Foote, 76 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934), error ref.
"Liberman v. Liberman, 279 N.Y. 458, 18 N.E.2d 658 (1939).
2" Id.
24Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Dunman, 74 Tex. 265, 11 S.W. 1094 (1889); Jeffery v. Graham,
61 Tex. 481 (1858); Williams v. Box Church Baptist Church, 75 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934), error ref.; Green v. Gresham, 53 S.W. 383 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899).
21 Jeffries v. State, 212 Ark. 213, 205 S.W.2d 194 (1947).
"Hughes v. Gladewater County Line Independent School, 124 Tex. 190, 76 S.W.2d 471
(1934); Ryan v. Porter, 61 Tex. 106 (1884).
27 Casner, Property Disposition Under the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, in JOINT COMM. ON
THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 85TH CONG., IST SESS., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND STABILITY 847 (Comm. Print 1955).
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demic nature. It becomes a practical consideration, however, when legisla-
tion is proposed concerning limited interests." The disadvantages of a term
interest are considerably greater, and this probably explains its relatively
rare appearance. For example, it is highly improbable that the beneficiary
would die on the exact day the term ended. If death occurred before it
ended, the interest in the remaining portion of the term would be included
within the beneficiary's gross estate."9 If the term ended before the death
of the beneficiary, the grant would not adequately implement the probable
desire of the testator to care for the beneficiary for life.
A more flexible interest which the grantor might transfer to the inter-
mediate generation is a life interest in a discretionary trust. The interest
which such a beneficiary possesses is totally controlled by the document
creating the trust. The trustee may be provided with the power to deter-
mine the amounts of payments to the beneficiaries, whether any payments
should be made, and even who will be beneficiaries. The power to select
beneficiaries, however, must include at least "such a description . . . of
the beneficiaries that they can be identified from extrinsic facts,"'3 or the
trust will be void. 1 In addition, the trustees may not be given the power
to select the grantor as a beneficiary if the trust is inter vivos, for this
would result in the corpus being included in the grantor's gross estate at
his death. 2 Further, if there is a single beneficiary, he may not be made the
sole trustee since the legal and equitable titles would merge, and he would
own the property in fee."3 Despite these limitations,' the discretionary trust
provides a highly flexible tool which allows the trustees to distribute the
proceeds of the corpus according to the changing needs of the beneficiaries.
When generation-skipping transfers are involved, this becomes extremely
important since the length of time covered makes it difficult to provide an
inflexible plan that will be appropriate to future conditions.'
Disposition of Remainder Interests. The remainder interest in the property
which will vest in the next generation may be distributed in a number of
ways. The simplest disposition is a grant in fee to the beneficiaries named
in the instrument of transfer. The remainder may also be distributed by a
special power of appointment, a power to invade the corpus according to
an ascertainable standard, or limited powers of invasion. By giving these
powers to the intermediate beneficiary or the trustee, the tax advantages
are achieved, and the skipped generation retains much of the control over
2ALT Study Draft No. 1, at 128.
2 Estate of A.E. Agnus, 17 B.T.A. 266 (1930), rev'd on other grounds, 46 F.2d 756 (4th
Cir. 1931).
"o2 A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 112 (2d ed. 1956).
"tDavidson v. Wyman, 214 Mass. 192, 100 N.E. 1105 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1913). A grant to the
trustee to dispose of the remainder in "their absolute discretion" is void.
3' Estate of Carolyn Pack Broadman, 20 T.C. 871 (1953).
" Cashion v. Cashion, 242 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951), error ref.; TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-7 (1960).
4Where the trustee has discretion to accumulate income, a possible accounting problem con-
cerning income tax arises if the trustee should in any year pay out more than the income of the
corpus since the five-year throw-back rule of INT. REv. Corn of 1954, § 666 is applicable in such




Special Powers of Appointment. Property subject to power of appoint-
ment is not included in the gross estate of an individual as long as it is not
a general power of appointment as defined in section 2041 (b) (1) of the
Internal Revenue Code. " A general power is one which may be exercised
in favor "of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his
estate."37 A special power is one which the donee may exercise only in favor
of a particular class or enumerated individuals" and may not exercise in
favor of himself, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate."
Since property subject to a special power is not included in the holder's
estate, a grantor may give the intermediate beneficiary a special power of
appointment in addition to one of the limited interests and still protect
the property from taxation.' In this fashion the grantor may give his direct
descendants almost complete control over the disposition of the remainder
and still avoid the tax consequences of an outright gift to them.
Limited Power To Invade Corpus. If the property is put in trust, the
beneficiary may also be given the power to invade the corpus in any given
year to the extent of the greater of five per cent of the corpus or $5,000
under section 2041 (b) (2)."' This power will not draw the entire corpus
into the beneficiary's estate. However, upon his death, the beneficiary's
estate will include the amount which could be obtained by the exercise of
the beneficiary's power if he has not exercised it within the preceding
year.
In addition, possible income tax disadvantages arise when the five per
cent or $5,000 clause is inserted. One complication is created by sections
671' and 678"4 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 678 provides that,
"A person other than the grantor shall be treated as owner of any portion
of a trust with respect to which ...such person has a power exercisable
solely by himself to vest the corpus or income in himself." Section 671
provides in part that, "No items of a trust shall be included in computing
the taxable income and credits of the grantor or any other person solely
on the grounds of his dominion and control over the trust under section
61 .. .or any other provision of this title, except as specified in this sub-
part." 0 Section 671 apparently was inserted to negate the "Clifford"4 doc-
trine which provided that a person would be taxed on the income of a trust
where "the corpus of the trust was so far subject to the taxpayer's unfet-
tered dominion that it in substance was his . . .4' The two sections to-
gether seem to indicate that if the trust has income and the possessor of the
" INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2041(b) (1).
37 Id.
38 L. SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS 124 (2d ed. 1966).
39 26 C.F.R. § 20.2041-1 (c) (1) (1961).
4026 C.F.R. §§ 20.2041-1(c), 25.2514-1(1) (1961).
4 1 
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2041 (b) (2).
4226 C.F.R. § 20.2041-3 (a) (3) (1961).
"' INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 671.
44Id. 5 678.
4Id.
46 Id. 5 671.
47Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
4 Richardson v. Commissioner, 121 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1941).
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power does not withdraw the five per cent or $5,000, he is taxed upon the
income produced by that portion of the corpus although he never re-
ceived the income, because under section 678 he had the power to vest in
himself the corpus which produced that income." For example, if five per
cent of the trust would produce an income of $1,000 and the beneficiary
had the power to withdraw five per cent of the corpus at his sole discre-
tion, he would have to pay income tax on the $1,000 even though he never
received it. However, if he possessed the power only in conjunction with
some other person, he would not be taxed on the $1,000."'
Another possible income tax disadvantage arises under section 662, which
provides that "There shall be included in the gross income of a beneficiary
... (2) All amounts properly paid, credited, or required to be distributed
to such beneficiary for the taxable year."'" The regulations provide that,
"There is included in the gross income of a beneficiary under section
662 (a) (2) any amounts properly paid, credited, or required to be dis-
tributed to the beneficiary for the taxable year, other than ... amounts in
excess of distributable net income."" Therefore, it would seem that if the
trust has income which is not distributed and the possessor of the power
does withdraw the five per cent or $5,000, the amount withdrawn will be
subject to income tax to the extent that there was undistributed income
in the trust. For example, if a trust had undistributed income of $4,000 and
the beneficiary exercised his right to withdraw $5,000, the beneficiary
would pay income tax on $4,000 even though his power was limited to the
withdrawal of corpus. If the trust had not accumulated income, the bene-
ficiary would not be taxed on the amount of corpus which he withdrew. 3
No case has been found where the Commissioner made these contentions.
However, the statutes raise the possibility that it could be asserted. Al-
though the power of invasion has these possible disadvantages, it would
greatly enhance the control which the intermediate beneficiary could
exercise over the property.
Invasion of the Corpus Subject to an Ascertainable Standard. If a trust
is created by the generation-skipping transfer, the remainder interest may
also be distributed, at least in part, by giving the trustee power to invade
the corpus for the benefit of the intermediate beneficiaries. However, if
favorable tax advantages are to be obtained, a high degree of care must be
used in selecting the trustee and in describing his power of invasion, especi-
ally if the trust is discretionary. It is clear that the grantor should never be
selected as trustee of a discretionary trust. Section 2036 would pull the
corpus back into his gross estate since he would have the "right . . . to
designate the person, or persons who shall possess or enjoy the transferred
property or income therefrom."'" In addition, section 2038 concerning
0*26 C.F.R. § 1.671-3(b)(3) (1961).
50But see Rev. Rul. 67-241, 1967 INT. REV.. BULL. No. 31, at 10.
SINT. REv. CooE of 1954, § 662 (a) (2).
226 C.F.R. § 1.662(a)-3 (1961).
53 Rev. Rul. 67-241, 1967 INT. REV. BULL. No 31, at 10.
54INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 2036.
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revokable transfers would reach the same result, because the decedent
would have the power "to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate""' the trans-
fer.
If the beneficiaries are the trustees of a discretionary trust, extraordinary
care must be used in drafting the instrument to assure that their powers of
invasion conform to the "ascertainable standard" under section 2041 (b) -
(1) (A)." The Code defines the ascertainable standard as "relating to the
health, education, support, or maintenance of the decedent." ' If the power
to invade is not limited by an acceptable ascertainable standard, it will be
considered a general power, and the corpus will be considered as part of
the beneficiary-trustee's gross estate at his death." This, of course, defeats
the tax avoidance plan, and the slightest deviation is often fatal. For ex-
ample, in Strite v. McGinnes' the corpus was included in a beneficiary's
estate at death because as trustee he had the power to invade corpus for
"reasonable needs.., or comfort." Thus, if the beneficiary-trustee is given
powers of invasion, care should be taken to track the language of the regu-
lations, for any deviation presents the possibility that the right to invade
will be considered a general power.
Conclusion. The limited and remainder interests may be used in various
combinations. The use of the traditional life tenant-remainderman arrange-
ment produces a disposition that is completely inflexible from the time the
conveyance takes effect.61 Changes in the circumstances of the beneficiaries
may not be taken into account as the future becomes the present. In addi-
tion, the inflexible characteristics of the life tenant-remainderman transfer
are somewhat undesirable, since the intermediate beneficiaries have little
control over the final disposition of the property." The combined use of a
discretionary trust with special powers of appointment allows generations
to be skipped and still enables the intermediate beneficiaries to retain a
great amount of control. However, if the intermediate beneficiary is also
to be trustee and thus gain maximum control, the trust must be carefully
drafted."
Many traps for the unwary exist in this area, and the presentation here
is somewhat oversimplified. However, the testator's wishes may be success-
fully fulfilled by the use of transfers which allow maximum flexibility dur-
ing the life of the trust and in the final disposition of the remainder.
I1. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST CHANGE
As with most situations, two views exist as to the advisability of chang-
ing the tax structure to prevent generation-skipping transfers. Although
55 1d. § 2038.
561Id. § 2041 (b) (1) (A).
57 Id.
5 8 Id. § 2041(b).
59Strite v. McGinnes, 330 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 1964).
6026 C.F.R. § 20.2041-1(c)(2) (1961). A power to use property for comfort, welfare, or
happiness is not limited by the required standard.
61 Casner, supra note 27, at 8 53.
6 2 id. at 8 54.
6 Estate of Josephine B. Lanigan, 45 T.C. 247 (1965).
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most experts in the estate tax field agree that the present system has some
problems, some believe that changing the present system would create more
problems than it would solve.
The major argument for change is that the present system creates an
inequitable situation. For example, if a man with one child had an estate of
$500,000, and only testamentary transfers were made, then, after estate
taxes, $255,224 of the corpus could be transferred to the third generation.
Conversely, if a man with one child had an estate of $500,000 and trans-
ferred it by a generation-skipping device in which the child was made dis-
cretionary beneficiary, a co-trustee, and had a power to invade the corpus
to the extent of five per cent or $ 5,000 and in which the trustees had the
power to invade according to an ascertainable standard, $354,000 would
remain after estate taxes to be transferred to the third generation. The
power that each intermediate beneficiary possessed gave him almost com-
plete control over the property. Therefore, when the beneficiary in the sec-
ond transfer escapes taxation for estate taxes upon his death, the result is an
inequality in the tax statutes." Those who oppose the change simply point
out that the beneficiary in the second transfer does not own the property
to which the limited interest attaches. Therefore, a tax upon the beneficiary
with respect to the transfer of property which he does not own would be
unfair."
The proponents of change have two important points. When generation
skipping occurs, the lack of a tax in the first succeeding generation reduces
the tax base by fifty per cent. Furthermore, if two generations are skipped,
the tax base is reduced to one-third of what it would have been if there
had been no generation skipping. Therefore, the revenue producing ability
of the tax is impaired." Finally, the present law and the loopholes that exist
could tend to encourage long-term trusts. Since trusts are noted for their
conservative investment requirements, these long-term trusts tend to drain
risk capital from the economy, which could affect the continued growth
and stability of the economy."
The opponents of a change in the present law point out that most of
the proposals for change either impose a penalty"0 for using a generation-
skipping transfer or are extremely complicated."0 In view of these facts,
many transfers in trust might be discouraged. This could be detrimental
because there are valid non-tax reasons for using generation-skipping trusts.
Finally, such a drastic change in the federal estate and gift tax statute
would result in an era of confusion. Instruments drawn under the old law
and coming into operation after the change could dispose of property in an
inappropriate manner. A time lag would invariably occur between the
" ALI Study Draft No. 1, at xxxii.
" Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, in JOINT COMM. ON THE Eco-
NOMIC REPORT, 84TH CONG., IST SEss., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
STABILITY 819 (Comm. Print 1955).
66STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM:
FACTS AND PROBLEMS (Comm. Print 1964).
67 Id.
68 SHOUP 46-48.




effective date of a change and an adequate interpretation by the courts so
that attorneys could not be confident of the results of an instrument until
many years had passed."
Each of these factions makes its arguments with considerable force. Con-
gress, while recognizing the shortcomings of the present law, has not yet
found an alternative which it feels will remedy the situation.
The British System. In Great Britain, the termination of a life estate is a
"passing" of property." The interest which is taxed is the whole value of
any property which finally vests in possession because of the decedent's
death." Accumulations within a trust have not been extensively discussed,
but apparently they are taxed upon the death of the life beneficiary or the
last contingent beneficiary; therefore, they do not escape the tax.
The tax may be paid from either of two possible funds, depending on the
situation." If the personal representatives of the deceased are accountable,
they must pay the tax out of the estate. When the personal representatives
are not responsible, every person who receives a beneficial interest is liable
for the tax to the extent of property actually received.74
IV. PROPOSALS FOR TAXING GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFERS
The proposals to tax generation-skipping transfers generally suggest a
tax on the property at the time the limited interest expired or at the time
property was transferred by the donor in such a way that generations
would be skipped. Four different types of proposals have been considered.
They are the British system, a succession tax, an additional tax, and the
changing of the present law with respect to powers of appointment.
In studying these proposals, three main problems must be kept in mind.
First, how does the proposal define the interest which it would attempt to
tax? Features which should be especially noted are the taxable event and
the fund from which the tax is payable. Second, how does the proposal
handle an interest in discretionary trusts? Finally, how does the proposed
system of taxation handle accumulation trusts?
Two glaring problems exist within the British system. If the property
is left in a discretionary trust, no estate tax is due until the next-to-last
beneficiary dies and the last beneficiary becomes entitled to the whole in-
come. Moreover, the tax falls upon the corpus of the trust or upon the
property to which the life interest attached. Although taxation of a life
interest may be desirable, the taxation of the whole corpus seems inequit-
able since the individual was never the owner of the capital and did not
have control over it during his life. This over-taxation probably would
make the British system inapplicable in the United States.75
70Alexander, supra note $, at 636.
71 JANTSCHER 163.
72 Dworkin, Estate Taxation in Great Britain, in ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, A COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY 68 (G. Wheatcroft ed. 1965).
7
" Id. at 82.
' The rate of taxation is the rate applicable to the deceased beneficiary's estate on the whole
value of the corpus.
7' Wheatcroft, Proposals for a System of Estate and Gift Taxation, in ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION, A COMPARATIVE STUDY 134 (G. Wheatcroft ed. 1965).
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The Succession Tax. The succession tax suggested by the American Law
Institute is similar to the British system. It proposes a tax upon termination
of the enjoyment of a beneficial interest."' The taxable event is the expira-
tion of a limited interest such as a life estate, term of years, discretionary
interest in a trust, or any other transfer.
Any transfer of a beneficial interest is excluded from taxation if the
property has been subjected to the succession tax in the last thirty years."
The drafters of the ALI proposal believe that this system would success-
fully tax the interests which are presently escaping taxation by generation-
skipping transfers.
The discretionary trust which has defeated the British estate tax is han-
dled in detail. The ALI proposal would consider a person as having an in-
terest in a discretionary trust if he ever received benefits from it."8 There-
fore, upon the death of each beneficiary, a taxable event would occur. The
deceased beneficiary's interest in the corpus would be based upon the pro-
portion of the beneficial enjoyment which he received from the trust in
relation to the total benefits which had been dispensed by the trust. Thus,
if a trust with a corpus of $100,000 paid $100 to each of three possible
beneficiaries, upon the death of one beneficiary, a succession tax would be
due upon one-third of the corpus."
The problem of an accumulation trust is solved by placing a tax upon
a mandatory accumulation trust every thirty years. Presumably, this is
intended to discourage the long-term accumulation trusts.
The ALI proposals place the tax at the most logical time, the passing of
the interest. However, the ALI dropped the succession tax proposal from
its Study Draft No. 2, probably because of the complicated nature of the
tax and possible administrative problems which were discovered.
The Additional Tax. Another proposal is to impose an additional tax over
and above the gift or estate tax if the grantor or decedent places property
in a generation-skipping transfer."
The basic features of the tax are different from those which have tradi-
tionally existed in the gift and estate tax field. The taxable event would be
the passing of the property to the intermediate beneficiary. Therefore, no
tax would be due upon the expiration of the beneficiary's interest. The tax
would be payable from the estate of the grantor. The liability would be
7 ALI Study Draft No. 1, at 118.
SId. at 170.
78 id. at 134.
71 Jantscher has proposed a tax on the expiration of a limited interest which takes the problem
of valuation into consideration. He would value the limited interest by discounting the income
actually received. This might result in no taxation of accumulations in the trust. JANTSCHER
172-78.
Wheatcroft also has a proposal which is not so well defined. He would tax the actuarial value
of the interest at the beginning of the interest. However, the taxable event would be the death of
the beneficiary. If the interest were a discretionary one or if a trust accumulated income, the tax
would be imposed every five years at a penal rate. Wheatcroft, supra note 75.
"
0 ALI, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAX PROJECT 106-21 (Study Draft No. 2, 1966) [herein-
after cited as ALI Study Draft No. 2]. For example, if the property passed by a testamentary
generation -skipping transfer, the total tax due would be the estate tax plus the additional tax. If
the property passed by an inter vivos generation-skipping transfer, the total due would be the gift
tax plus the additional tax.
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similar to the present gift tax."
The difficulties associated with the additional tax are numerous but
probably not insurmountable. The problems of the discretionary trust and
the accumulation trust are thought to be solved by the initial tax. How-
ever, the taxation of transfers traditionally has taken place at the time the
property is transferred. The public is accustomed to this type of taxation."
The additional tax is paid at the time the future passing of a beneficial in-
terest becomes mandatory but before the passage of the property. There-
fore, there could be some problem in public acceptance. Also, the additional
tax might tend to discourage the transfer of property into certain types of
generation-skipping trusts." The trust was not initially developed for tax
advantages, and valid reasons exist for the use of a certain number of
generation-skipping transfers." The tax, however, might prevent the use
of the device when it is appropriate if an additional tax upon the property
were considered as a penalty. " This is perhaps the main objection, and this
objection could have great impact upon the public acceptance of the tax.
This tax apparently would be easier to administer than the succession
tax. It also has the advantage of being easier for the layman to understand.
However, it looks like a penalty.
Changing the Present Statute Relating to Powers of Appointment and In-
vasion of Corpus. The controversy over generation skipping apparently
arose because of the great amount of control which the intermediate bene-
ficiary could be given over the corpus and still not be subject to estate taxes
upon his death. This situation possibly could be eliminated by some change
in the law relating to powers of appointment and invasion of corpus. " All
powers, both general and special, could be brought into the gross estate of
the holder. However, this probably is not desirable since such a change
would deter the use of powers where they are appropriate and would cause
problems with many outstanding instruments. Congress also could provide
that only the property subject to special powers exercisable in favor of a
limited number of beneficiaries would be excluded from the gross estate of
the holder. However, this would be ineffective to stop generation skipping
since most special powers are in fact only exercised in favor of a limited
number of beneficiaries, viz., the descendants of the donee of the power. If
the beneficiaries were limited to a specific number, generation skipping still
would be possible, and an already technical statute would be more technical
and unmanageable.
Finally, property subject to a special power could be included in the
S8 The rate would have to be determined from a separate table. The rate would be progressively
higher as the number of generations which the grantor skipped increased. ALl Study Draft No. 2,
at 120.
8 Casner, supra note 69.
83 Alexander, supra note 5, at 671.
84Heslin, Federal Estate and Gift Tax Proposals-Reformation or Deformation?, 106 TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 340 (1967).
85 Id.
88 Bittker, Recommendations for a Revision of Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, in JOINT COMM.
ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 84TH CONG., 1ST SEss., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND STABILITY 864 (Comm, Print 1955).
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gross estate if the holder of the power had a limited interest in the prop-
erty subject to the power or was closely related to such a person. This
would eliminate the great amount of control which the intermediate bene-
ficiary can presently exert over the ultimate disposition of the corpus of a
trust or remainder interests. Of the three changes described, this one seems
most workable. However, such a change would be highly technical.
The objections which are raised in relation to the right to invade the
corpus to the extent of the greater of five per cent or five thousand dollars
could be eliminated by striking the provision from the statute. This would
eliminate much of the control that the intermediate beneficiary can exer-
cise over the corpus and would, in addition, make the Code less technical.
A change in the present law would probably be the most realistic ap-
proach. However, the change would in most cases make the Code more
technical. Although such a change has been suggested, the Congress has
not seen fit to adopt it. 7
V. CONCLUSION
The federal estate and gift tax system initially was intended to tax the
gratuitous transfer of all property. The loophole that allows generation
skipping was completely unintentional. Therefore, to make the present tax
more effective this loophole should be closed. The decision concerning
which tax to adopt should be based upon the ease of administration and
the acceptability and equity of the tax.
The succession tax probably would have few problems of acceptability
since its timing is familiar. Taxation at the expiration of a limited interest
would require considerable re-education of the public, lawyers, account-
ants, and the government. The succession tax probably would be more
equitable, but this ultimately depends on the rate structure. However, the
administration of the tax is its shortcoming. The definitional problems and
the complexity of the statute probably would make interpretation and ad-
ministration difficult.
The additional tax probably would be relatively easy to administer. The
problems associated with definitions and which interests to tax are less
complex than in the succession tax. However, the public probably would
not accept the additional tax, since it looks like a penalty.
The suggested changes in the present law concerning powers of appoint-
ment would not eliminate the possibility of tax avoidance by generation
skipping. However, the change would remove much of the flexibility from
generation-skipping transfers. Without this flexibility, the desirability of
such a transfer would be greatly reduced, and the tax avoidance by gen-
eration skipping should be reduced.
What changes should be made? The additional tax should be disregarded
since it imposes what seems to be a penalty upon the transfer of property
by generation skipping. Therefore, the choice is whether to enact stop-
gap measures by changing the present system in relation to powers of ap-
pointment and invasion of corpus or to wait until the succession tax is
perfected.
87 Id. at 870.
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